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DRAFT
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U. S. SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

1. **OBJECTIVE.** Develop a national policy which resolves any conflicts which might arise between the essential technical and security requirements of the U. S. satellite reconnaissance program and the international commitments and foreign policy objectives of the United States in a manner which is in the overall best interests of the national security of the United States. In particular, the policy should be designed to:
 - a. Maintain our absolute freedom of action unilaterally to conduct reconnaissance satellite operations.
 - b. Prevent foreign political and physical interference with the conduct of these operations.
 - c. Prevent accidental or forced disclosure of details of the operations of and products of the U. S. satellite reconnaissance program.
 - d. Avoid situations, statements or actions which, in the context of our satellite reconnaissance program, could later be exploited as evidence either of alleged U. S. aggressiveness or duplicity.
2. **DISCUSSION.** Several factors have a significant bearing upon the determination of an adequate and defensible policy, and in the determination

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of the steps necessary for its successful implementation.

a. The essential security and technical requirements of the U. S. satellite reconnaissance program are not necessarily incompatible with foreign policy objectives enunciated by the U. S. , nor do they necessarily conflict with existing commitments assumed by the U. S. in international agreements on outer space matters. However, there is potential conflict of a serious nature unless U. S. foreign policy actions are most carefully formulated and conducted in full recognition of the characteristics and problems of satellite reconnaissance. It is clear that in negotiations involving outer space and disarmament certain issues have been and will be raised that have serious implications for the U. S. reconnaissance satellite program and on which the U. S. position must be carefully formulated and vigorously defended.

b. The U. S. is not at present legally bound to observe any commitments regarding the use of outer space. However, as a matter of present national policy, the U. S. does consider itself bound to comply with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1721(XVI), which the U. S. drafted and sponsored and which was unanimously adopted by the UNGA on December 20, 1961. That Resolution commends to States for their guidance in the exploration and use of outer space two principles:

(1) International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies;

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(2) Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity with international law, and are not subject to national appropriation.

c. Pursuant to UNGA Resolution 1721, the United States is presently registering satellite launchings with the U. N. There is no internationally agreed formula governing the data provided for registration with the United Nations.

d. Also pursuant to UNGA Resolution 1721, the U. S. has taken part in the work of the U. N. Outer Space Committee. At the recent meetings of the Committee's Legal Subcommittee in Geneva, the U. S. proposed:

(1) A draft General Assembly Resolution regarding assistance to and return of space vehicles and their occupants, and

(2) A draft resolution requesting the Secretary General of the U. N. to constitute a panel of experts to draft an international agreement dealing with liability of launching states and international organizations for injury, loss or damage caused by space vehicles.

These proposals were carefully framed with the intent of not affecting the U. S. satellite reconnaissance program. It should be noted, however, that the issue banning reconnaissance satellites was specifically raised by the Soviets in a Draft Declaration of Principles. The question of exempting reconnaissance satellites from any agreement to return

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space vehicles inadvertently landing on the territory of other States was also raised and supported not only by the Bloc, but by some other countries as well. The Legal Subcommittee was unable to reach agreement on any substantive issues and agreed only to establish working groups to examine possible compromise proposals. The U. S. Delegation in the Outer Space Technical Subcommittee, which met concurrently proposed that reports on general national plans for international space activities be submitted to the Outer Space Committee and agreement was reached on this point. It was made clear by the United States (and by the Soviet Union) that such information will be submitted on a purely voluntary basis and at the discretion of the reporting State.

e. There are at present no international agreements on disarmament or arms control. However, the present U. S. disarmament proposal, to which we are committed, includes a provision which would affect the reconnaissance satellite program. The Treaty Outline on General and Complete Disarmament of April 18, 1962, includes as a measure in Stage One provision for prohibition of the placing into orbit of weapons capable of producing mass destruction. For verification of this measure, inspection of vehicles and advance notification of all launchings of space vehicles and missiles, including information on the track of the space vehicles or missiles, would be provided. In addition, the International Disarmament Organization would establish any arrangements necessary

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for detecting unreported launches. Finally, the production, stockpiling, and testing of boosters for space vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations. The U. S. is also committed to consideration of the general idea of a possible separate disarmament agreement limited to banning weapons of mass destruction from outer space. We have not, however, advanced specific provisions of such agreement.

f. Public official statements, budgetary funding of the reconnaissance satellite program for fiscal years prior to FY 1963, and limited publicity about launching of developmental vehicles associated with the program, have committed the U. S. to some degree of public acknowledgment of this program. Intent to develop a reconnaissance capability is on record. The first officially acknowledged developmental satellite reconnaissance flight was launched over a year ago. Although very general facts of these activities are public knowledge, details of the technical approaches involved are not known to the public. No official statement has indicated what results might have been achieved or information obtained from satellite reconnaissance.

g. The existence of a U. S. requirement for effective intelligence on the Sino Soviet Bloc is generally clear to the governments of the principal countries of the free world, as well as to official military and some other groups in those countries. Available evidence indicates that these elements generally support U. S. efforts to develop reconnaissance satellite systems. In some cases, U. S. activities in connection

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with satellites (not specifically reconnaissance satellites) have aroused local concern. In Japan, for example, there has been reluctance to cooperate with NASA on the establishment of U. S. tracking facilities because of suspicion that space weapons might be or become involved. In Zanzibar and Nigeria some groups have argued that the presence of U. S. tracking stations is inconsistent with a neutralist posture since the stations may involve U. S. activities of a military nature. These scattered evidences of concern suggest that a concerted Sino Soviet Bloc campaign attributing sinister and threatening motives to U. S. military (including reconnaissance) satellite programs might elicit a favorable and sympathetic reaction, not only from anti-U. S. elements, but also from some others concerned with any heightening of international tension. U. S. private diplomatic efforts to gain support for the concept of the right of space reconnaissance would probably counteract the Soviet campaign to some degree, though it is unlikely that the U. S. could at this time gain widespread support for a positive affirmation in the U. N. or other international forum of the right to conduct space reconnaissance.

h. Due to the extreme differences between the U. S. open society and the tightly closed Soviet society, the value of reconnaissance from satellites is infinitely greater to the U. S. than to the Soviets. Consequently, what the Soviets may choose to do in regard to conducting reconnaissance from satellites should have no bearing upon U. S. satellite reconnaissance activities.

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i. The critical U. S. need for satellite reconnaissance is a continuing, not a temporary problem. It will not disappear when the initial Soviet ICBM deployment is complete. Subsequent deployment of later versions of newer missiles will be much more difficult to locate, particularly if the Soviets give any consideration to concealing them from the outset of such deployment. It will also be extremely important to monitor the actual operational status of deployed missiles. Consequently, regardless of the state of U. S. knowledge at any given time, the "problem of Soviet secrecy" can never be solved completely by satellite reconnaissance. Soviet reactions, including camouflage and other reactions, can alter substantially their order of battle within a relatively short time period. For these reasons, high acuity satellite reconnaissance will continue to increase in importance, and U. S. capability to operate continuously with high effectiveness must not be compromised on the basis of our knowledge at any particular time.

j. Appeal to potentially wide usefulness of observation satellites is not a viable defense for reconnaissance activities unless the mere fact that observations are made from a satellite is sufficient for defense of all observation satellites, which seems most improbable. In this case, there would be no need to involve satellite reconnaissance activities at all, since this defense could be based entirely upon meteorological

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satellite projects already publicly disclosed. If defense depends in any manner upon the type of such observation, then the fact must be faced that reconnaissance photography is primarily useful only as an intelligence gathering method for reasons outlined below, and cannot plausibly be defended on the basis of scientific or ancillary utility:

(1) The current state of the art in satellite operation, and the technical characteristics of reconnaissance photography are such that public disclosure of such photography under any other name will not camouflage its basic purpose. Neither is there any possibility of passing mapping photography as reconnaissance photography, due to important and significant differences between these two types of photography. Mapping photography is characterized by high geometric fidelity but very poor resolution, on the order of several hundred feet. Reconnaissance photography includes substantial geometric distortion, but must have high resolution in order that missile sites, etc. may be identified. There is no known ancillary use of this type of photography that could possibly account for the current expense and effort of acquiring the photography by satellite. Any attempt to explain such current activities on the basis of scientific and public service functions would be most unrealistic. Flood control, water resources utilization and road planning and construction, urban renewal and redevelopment and under developed areas clearly cannot justify any satellite observation program; any such

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application of satellite observation capabilities is obviously a by-product and not a plausible explanation for the flights. Photography applicable to all these functions is much more easily, quickly and cheaply obtained today by use of aircraft, and the informed international community would easily and quickly conclude that if these purposes are in fact the objective of the U. S., then it is absurd to choose satellites rather than aircraft as the basic vehicle. From a reconnaissance viewpoint, the aircraft is also technically superior to the satellite. The ground resolution obtainable is directly proportional to the altitude and inversely proportional to the combined resolution of the optics-mechanism-film-atmosphere processing chain, with the result that the (relatively) low altitude of aircraft permits photography of better resolution. Thus, however the situation may change in the future, the only presently justifiable reason for taking reconnaissance photographs of the earth from a satellite is to serve as an inferior, however acceptable legal substitute for the obtaining of such photography by illegal aircraft overflights. No amount of public discussion of satellite reconnaissance or of ancillary derivatives can mask this fact from any countries who choose to object to such flights.

(2) Release of satellite reconnaissance photography would disclose the technical capability of the collecting equipment. Without such release, the Soviets must estimate the nature of the collecting

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system and its likely capability. In addition to being uncertain, this process involves consideration of various possibilities that might be used; disclosure of photography would confirm both the approach and the intelligence capability.

(3) Reconnaissance photography, particularly of the Soviet Bloc, would be an exceptionally interesting matter to the public. Disclosure of such photography would certainly provoke a substantial increase of publicity of reconnaissance activities. Correspondents and others would undoubtedly try their hand at becoming amateur photographic interpreters, making their own investigation of Soviet military capability by tabulating missile sites, airfields, etc., which they think they can identify and count in the released photography, or, conversely, noting the absence of such things in the photography. This could not fail to result in considerable publicity and would certainly be more provocative to the Soviets than the absence of such photography and publicity.

(4) Release of reconnaissance photography would reveal what has been covered at the time of such release and what we could, and therefore probably have, learned from this photography. The Soviets would easily identify what we have not discovered, while we cannot identify what we have not discovered. The result would be that the Soviets could tell more easily than we what the actual balance of military capabilities are at a given time, clearly an advantage to the Soviets and not to the U.S.

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k. While the electronic signal elements of the satellite reconnaissance program may attract less public interest, they may in fact attract Soviet interest approaching that caused by photographic reconnaissance. Effective electronic signal reconnaissance can identify significant characteristics of many aspects of essential military electronic devices and installations, including ~~new~~ types of radar, guidance equipment, location of all warning and tracking equipment, etc., as well as acquiring communications intelligence. There is certainly no reason to expect that this type of reconnaissance by satellite is more acceptable to the Soviets than photographic reconnaissance.

L. Effective reconnaissance requires surprise and secrecy, regardless of the public attitude of the Soviets on the subject. Without a capability to operate satellite reconnaissance vehicles on a completely secret launch basis, in the near term future, there is serious risk of substantial impairment of U. S. reconnaissance effectiveness at a time when its importance will be even greater than at present. It should be noted that by secret operations it is not contemplated that the Soviets will not know that satellite reconnaissance operations are being conducted, or will never be able to detect such vehicles in transit over Soviet territory. However, it is contemplated that they will not be able to tell when or where such flights will be made in advance, and that they will

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
not be able to detect all flights due to not knowing the time or the direction to expect or the duration of the flight, and that many other flights that are detected will be tracked insufficiently to determine the orbit or the launch location. Such capability will require different launch capability than that being used at the present, and will involve relatively short orbital lifetimes, ranging from as little as a single pass or orbit to a maximum of four or five days. Present possible reconnaissance orbits are constrained by launch location and existing boosters to a relatively narrow band. The completely secret operations will require the capability to launch on a wide variety of inclinations, and must include mobile launch sites via aircraft and/or Naval vessels. (It should be noted that since these secret operations will involve single launches, there is no substantial risk of war due to possible misinterpretation as a ballistic missile strike, as it is unreasonable to expect either the U. S. or the Soviets to go to war on the basis of a single ballistic missile.) The need for these secret operations arises from the following two reasons:

(1) Satellite reconnaissance will have to be accomplished in this manner to be effective in the relatively near future. Without surprise, the intelligence value of such operations will decrease sharply as Soviet ICBM initial deployment is completed and these missiles enter the operational stage. It will be necessary to obtain reconnaissance when the Soviets are not expecting it and cannot predict the time and general orbital

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track.



(2) Satellite reconnaissance must be accomplished with secrecy to cope effectively with physical counteraction. There is reason to believe that the Soviets are developing an anti-satellite weapon system.

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and they may have some capability for anti-satellite operations by 1963. To cope effectively with physical anti-satellite measures will require the same variety of orbits, launch locations, and times as noted above. In addition, a variety of other provisions including decoys will be required. In this connection, it is essential that the nature of the physical counter-measures problem be understood clearly. Although it is common to say "shoot down" when referring to action against a satellite, "shoot apart" or "render inoperable" would be more appropriate. Physical counter-measures against satellite reconnaissance could include nuclear blast to fog film and damage electronic circuitry by electromagnetic pulses, as well as physical impact of projectiles or shot with the vehicle. Decoys and other countermeasures to confuse tracking will be required as well as the development of highly reliable one- or two-pass capability from mobile launches. This capability will require a very high degree of reliability and will take time to develop on the order of 2-3 years of intense effort, which must include actual flights. It cannot be postponed until the actual start of physical counteraction without resulting in a substantial period of delay at a most critical time.

m. If the U. S. becomes irrevocably committed to register all successful space launches regardless of how long in orbit, all launches of such secret operations will have to be registered in the same detail as all other U. S. launches. Since the secret launches cannot be totally

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concealed and since the U. S. could never be sure that very short orbits had not been tracked by the Soviets and others, there would not be any sound basis for denying that the activities exist and pretending that all U. S. launches were being registered. Consequently, all would have to be registered. Such short-lived satellites launched from secret mobile bases into a variety of orbits will be much more susceptible to Soviet political and propaganda attack than those launched from mainland facilities. Even after-the-fact registry of these launches would probably disclose launch date, time and place, and claim a variety of short-lived orbits by the United States, all passing over Soviet territory, practically all of which would not be detected by anyone other than the Soviets, and many of which would not be detected by the Soviets in time to acquire sufficient tracking data to determine the orbit or point of launch or to take effective physical countermeasures. Registry of short-lived satellites would also require registry of short-lived decoys, probably confirming their existence which would not otherwise have to be admitted, and would materially aid Soviet ballistic attacks. Such registry would also require public confirmation of possible cover tactics such as rendezvous of satellite reconnaissance vehicles with known orbital vehicles or debris.

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n. **Secrecy does not mean that illegal activities are being conducted. The practice of conducting illegal, though secret, military operations in international waters and air space has long been established. There is no reason why the U. S. should allow the lack of disclosure of details, timing and results of satellite reconnaissance efforts to be taken as a concession of illegality. Further, there is no reason why such effort requires any public denial that the U. S. is engaged in satellite reconnaissance, even secret satellite reconnaissance. The fact of existence of the U. S. satellite reconnaissance program can be admitted while refusing any details as to how it is being done. The fact that such details are not disclosed would be relevant only as the U. S. allowed it to become relevant by reacting defensively to criticism in this regard. Further, such action would not contradict the U. S. claim that satellite reconnaissance is legitimate. There is nothing inherently illegal in and no basis for criticism of secrecy of activities conducted on international water or in international air space; there is consequently no basis for valid objection in international space.**

o. **A secret Department of Defense Directive (No. S-5200.13) was published on March 23, 1962 instituting a new security and public information policy for all military space programs. Recognizing that it is impractical to selectively protect certain military space programs such as reconnaissance while continuing an open launch policy for others, since to do so would merely emphasize sensitive projects and identify sensitive launches by the simple process of elimination, this new policy**

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applies equally to all military space projects. Names and nicknames will no longer be used for any military space project and no identification will be made as to the specific mission of any military satellite launch at the time of launch or during flight. Subsequent disclosure that certain missions have been conducted will be done in a manner that will not retroactively identify the specific launch. Other appropriate steps will be taken to make it increasingly difficult to identify reconnaissance activities with certainty. When fully implemented, this policy will establish the capability to launch, control and recover military space vehicles without public knowledge or timing of these actions or of the specific mission involved. Due to the many related actions that are necessary to institute a policy of this scope, it is expected that some time will be required for the policy to reach maximum effectiveness. However, it has already reached the significant level whereby the U. S. has been removed from the position of confirming or denying the mission of any particular military satellite launch, and it is expected that the overall security will continuously improve over the next six months to one year.

p. It is most improbable that the U. S. will ever be able to prove before the world physical interference to reconnaissance satellites on the part of the Soviets. To plan that under such conditions the U. S. can say that all bets are off, withdraw from U. N. commitments and proceed with secret launches and operations would be relying upon a trumpet that will never sound. The most likely result of physical damage is lack of recovery.

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This may be caused by electronic circuit damage due to electromagnetic pulses from nuclear explosions, or from physical impact of projectiles or pellets, etc. In addition, photographic film could be fogged by nuclear explosions above the atmosphere at relatively long ranges. The Soviets' nuclear test range at Novaya Zemlya is in an ideal position for nuclear counteraction, since polar orbiting satellites make numerous passes within easy reach. The Soviets could simply state that they will be conducting intermittent tests for an indeterminate period of time, and that they are not responsible for flights over their range unless specific Soviet approval is granted. Such action, coupled with the consistent Soviet insistence that reconnaissance is illegal, could provide a firm Soviet position on the U. N. Moreover, due to the relatively low reliability of space vehicles, the U. S. could not prove that failure to recover was due to physical interference. Any damage to vehicles that should be recovered would be practically impossible to successfully attribute to Soviet action. Thus the U. S. would be in a far more difficult political situation than at present, forced to take action without proof at a time when Soviet military strength would be greater and the U. S. rationale substantially weaker after being forced to break established precedent without plausible public explanation. Furthermore, a considerable time, on the order of 2-3 years, will be required to develop the capability of secret operations before such operations could be effective, and this development will necessarily involve some secret flights prior to the development of operationally effective systems. If such development and flight is postponed until some time at which the U. S.

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would be willing on whatever basis to make such a public break in established precedent, the result would be a delay of two to three years.

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3. RECOMMENDED POLICY.

a. General Principles.

(1) Public and political emphasis should be focused on the unclassified aspects of the U. S. space activities, with full exploitation of their open character. However, the U. S. must not be drawn into conducting all space programs on this basis, or into a constant public defense of why it does not.

(2) The U. S. should avoid provocation that could support Soviet counteraction. Consequently, all public information on the subject of satellite reconnaissance should be kept in very low key.

(3) The U. S. should avoid forcing the Soviets to take counteraction. Consequently, all things which could not be ignored internally by the Soviet leaders should be avoided. (As an example, future confirmation by the President that the U. S. is obtaining reconnaissance of the Soviets by satellites and will continue to do so could not possibly be ignored by the Soviets. It would not matter what additional words of justification were used; such an unimpeachable confirmation would likely repeat the U-2 situation in this regard. It would not matter whether the Soviets already knew this for certain; they would not be forced to act on such knowledge. However, public confirmation from the highest level of government could not be ignored.)

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(4) The U. S. should approach all foreign policy objectives in such a manner as to avoid any compromise of the effectiveness of present or future reconnaissance satellite developments. This requires protection of the details, technical approaches, timing of missions, and both qualitative and quantitative results. It also requires protection of the U. S. right and development of U. S. capability to conduct unannounced launches from both fixed and movable bases, to use multiple decoys of various types without the necessity of identifying them as such, and the ability to conduct completely unidentified flights so that actual reconnaissance flights cannot positively be distinguished from other satellites.

(5) The U. S. should take irreversible steps only when the most compelling justification has been thoroughly substantiated by careful and searching review. (For example, the declassifying of presently classified aspects is irreversible, as is the confirmation of provocative facts by the President or other officials, or the public release of any reconnaissance results.)

(6) The U. S. should continue to work for widespread support for a positive affirmation in the U. N. or other international forum of the right to conduct space reconnaissance, the greatest care must be exercised so that the U. S. at no time becomes dependent upon such affirmation.

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b. Basic Posture.

(1) The U. S. should maintain the legal position that activities in outer space are governed by international law and, specifically, that all of outer space is free and open to peaceful uses just as are the high seas.

(2) The U. S. should maintain the position that the U. S. conduct of satellite reconnaissance activities is a legal, peaceful, non-aggressive, military activity, conducted in accordance with international law and completely consistent with the U. S. and the U. N. policies on the peaceful uses of outer space; that these activities are necessary to national defense in order to protect from surprise attack from closed societies, and pose no threat to any nation. Existence of these activities should continue to be acknowledged, but the existence of any reconnaissance results should neither be confirmed nor denied, and all details of the activities should remain classified. These activities should not be defended further, and in particular should not be described as or implied to be scientific or utilitarian experiments. Care should be exercised to avoid any position that would declare or imply that observation or reconnaissance activities in outer space are not peaceful use and are not legitimate.

(3) The U. S. should actively seek to gain the widest possible acceptance for the principle of freedom of space. The U. S. should, to the extent feasible, seek to avoid unnecessary public use of the

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term reconnaissance , and where appropriate to use instead such terms as observation of the earth , or photographic satellites. Such an argument should be made along the following lines:

International law imposes no prohibition on observation or photography of the earth from outer space. Such action is peaceful in character, and does not interfere with other activities on earth or in space. For example, we consider that the observations made by Major Titov while aboard Vostok II, as indeed any other observation which the USSR may be conducting from outer space, are peaceful. Observation of the earth from satellites makes possible the accomplishment of many tasks beneficial to mankind, such as weather forecasting, resource surveys, mapping, and geodesy. Many such activities have military applications, but this does not mean that they are non-peaceful.

At the same time, the U. S. should be careful not to avoid or disclaim interest in reconnaissance, since to attempt to do so would be unconvincing, would render the U. S. vulnerable to charges of deceit and evasiveness, would be an admission of doubt concerning the legality of such operations, and would preclude efforts to broaden acceptance of the principle of legitimacy of space reconnaissance. Therefore,

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whenever answer is being made to a question or proposal which specifically addresses or includes the word "reconnaissance", this word should be included in the reply. In this event, the last sentence of the argument cited above should read:

Many such activities have military applications, such as reconnaissance which can prevent surprise attack, but this does not mean that they are non-peaceful.

c. Management and Conduct of Effort.

(1) The U. S. satellite reconnaissance program should be conducted indefinitely within research and development activities and should not be associated with military operational commands.

(2) The U. S. satellite reconnaissance program should include priority development of all feasible capability to assure continued effectiveness in the face of Soviet camouflage efforts and physical countermeasures efforts, to include the development of adequate secret launch capability and adequate counter-countermeasures such as decoys, etc. The pace of this development should be such as to assure no gap in U. S. reconnaissance capability, regardless of Soviet actions.

d. Security.

(1) U. S. satellite reconnaissance activities should be conducted under very tight security procedures which confine exposure of program details to the fewest possible people and documents. All

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mission timing, collection system details, and qualitative and quantitative results should be protected from public disclosure by any means.

(2) Publicly observable operations should be protected to the maximum practical extent. Names and nicknames for all military space projects should be discontinued and no identification should be made as to the specific mission of any military satellite launch. Subsequent disclosure that certain missions have been conducted should be done in a manner that will not retroactively identify the specific launch. Other appropriate steps should be taken to make it increasingly difficult to identify reconnaissance activities with certainty.

e. Public Information.

(1) All public information on satellite reconnaissance activities should be most carefully and strictly controlled and handled in a very low key. Essentially, all releases should be answers by designated officials to direct query, following, and limited to, prepared guidance based upon and completely consistent with the policy outlined herein. Answers should be straightforward, factual, and not defensive or apologetic. No details should be given, and no statement should be made concerning the intent, scope, effectiveness or operational characteristics of the program.

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(2) In order to validate the U. S. claim of the legitimacy of observation satellites, a very few photographs should be released from future mapping missions. Such release should be confined to one photograph at a time, with very wide intervals between release, and should be handled in as low a key as possible. The photographs should be selected from U. S. territory at first, followed by foreign territory of a friendly nation, followed by territory of neutral and less friendly nations. Care should be taken not to imply that these photographs are from reconnaissance cameras, or that they were obtained solely or even primarily for humanitarian or utilitarian purposes; they should be labeled simply as releasable photographs which have been obtained from a U. S. observation satellite, and not discussed further. The sole objective of such release would be to establish the U. S. claim that observation is legal by occasional and infrequent demonstration that the U. S. is exercising its claimed right.

(3) Reconnaissance satellites should not be associated with possible weapons-carrying satellites, since relationships to disarmament and other matters differ. Strict control over public statements on development of anti-satellite capabilities should attempt to minimize publicity on this subject, and to avoid any indications that physical countermeasures to reconnaissance vehicles (or, indeed, to any other satellites) would be justified.

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(4) The U. S. should avoid any public statements about its satellite operations that would pose a direct political challenge to the Soviet Union on the issue of reconnaissance.

f. Protection of Information Source.

In any case where decision should be made in the future to make a public or private disclosure to the Soviets concerning some item or items of U. S. knowledge, extreme care should be taken to avoid any disclosure or even implication that the source of this knowledge was satellite reconnaissance.

g. U. N. Registry.

In connection with registry reports to the U. N. and related foreign policy actions, the U. S. should carefully avoid making any commitment or setting any precedent that the U. S. always registers all satellite launches. Although at present all launches are being either registered or noted in the supplemental registry information, complete U. S. freedom to omit short-lived launches in the future is imperative in order that the secret operations capability referred to in paragraph c(2) above can be developed. The necessary precedents should be established clearly and firmly prior to the time such secret launches are actually made.

h. Diplomatic Initiatives.

(1) The U. S. should privately seek support from allies and

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certain neutrals concerning the U. S. position on the subject of reconnaissance. The U. S. approach should be designed to impress upon them the importance which the U. S. attaches to the subject, its potential importance to the free world, the requirements it imposes on U. S. negotiating positions on outer space and disarmament matters, and the U. S. determination to protect and pursue a satellite reconnaissance program. However, this effort should not include specific disclosure of results, or any exposition of the actual U. S. program, other than the assertion that such a program exists, is extremely important in the U. S. view, and the U. S. is determined to pursue such activities.

(2) The U. S. should conduct private diplomatic efforts to gain widespread support for a positive affirmation in the U. N. or other international forum of the right to conduct space reconnaissance, but should exercise extreme care not to become dependent in any manner upon the success of this effort.

(3) The U. S. should not agree to advance notification of all space launchings.

(4) The U. S. should not agree to any separate arms control agreement concerning outer space which would require inspection of all satellite launches. (Although the U. S. is committed to the objective of banning weapons of mass destruction from outer space, it should be kept

In mind that, from a practical military point of view, weapons of mass destruction on the (missile) pad are far more dangerous than weapons in orbit; aside from the extreme problem of reliability of something in orbit for very long, an orbiting bomb is to a large extent a prisoner of celestial mechanics, with long times in between possible strikes on a given target, while a missile can be launched at any time to any target and reach it within approximately thirty minutes. Regardless of the public conception of the case, to agree to inspection by the Soviets of U. S. reconnaissance satellites in order to get an agreement to ban weapons of mass destruction from orbit would be to trade a horse for a rabbit.)

(5) The U. S. should not agree to make any exception for reconnaissance satellites in agreements to return space vehicles which land by accident, since to do so would be to admit that they are illegal.

(6) It is obvious from the events of the past six months that the U. S. satellite reconnaissance program is the Soviets' main target in the U. N. space arena, and all U. S. actions should be determined in full recognition of this fact. All U. S. proposals and actions in international forums should be reviewed critically, prior to being carried out, from the point of view of possible Soviet exploitation in this regard.